
In recent years, a wave of programs and companies have emerged promising to bring European startups into the U.S. market with ease. These accelerators often advertise with upbeat slogans – e.g., “The U.S. needs startups from [your country]!” – implying that American investors and customers are eagerly awaiting foreign innovators. The pitch is enticing: join their program (sometimes for a fee or equity), and they’ll guarantee success stateside. In reality, not all accelerators are created equal. According to industry experts, the term “accelerator” has been applied to very different models. Some venture accelerators (such as Y Combinator and Techstars) invest in startups in exchange for equity and provide a network and mentorship. Others are government- or corporate-funded accelerators that take no fees or equity (free support programs such as German Accelerator’s U.S. Market Access, backed by the German government). But a growing number are “paid accelerators” – essentially consulting programs selling advice or investor introductions for cash . These paid programs make you the client (not an invested portfolio company), and anyone can call themselves an “accelerator” in this space.
Red flags have been noted around some of these offerings. Founders warn that if an “accelerator” charges substantial upfront fees or focuses mainly on coaching you to fundraise (rather than helping build product or sales traction), it may be more hype than help. For example, one founder described an accelerator that lured startups with a “100% money-back guarantee,” only to hide a no-refund clause in the fine print. Such practices understandably sow skepticism. The core value of legitimate accelerators is usually in the mentorship, network, and sometimes capital they provide – none of which can ever truly guarantee success. Startups should be wary of any program that promises guaranteed results or “plug-and-play” U.S. expansion; as seasoned entrepreneurs note, accelerating a business is never one-size-fits-all, and success in a foreign market certainly can’t be pre-packaged.
Reputable accelerators do offer real benefits to startups, including foreign founders. Top-tier programs come with built-in networks of investors, partners, and peers – often a key shortcut for newcomers without U.S. connections. Participation can confer a credibility signal that impresses stakeholders; for instance, being a Y Combinator alum can boost a startup’s valuation and make hiring or fundraising easier. Accelerators also provide an “MBA on steroids” crash course for first-time founders – structured curricula of workshops and mentorship intended to rapidly level-up a startup CEO’s knowledge on fundraising, growth, legal, etc. In short, a good accelerator surrounds you with resources and pushes you into “hyperdrive mode,” often culminating in a Demo Day to pitch investors. These advantages have genuine value: studies have found that accelerator startups are more likely to raise venture capital and achieve revenue growth than those that never went through such programs. Some of the world’s biggest startup success stories – Airbnb, Reddit, Canva – are graduates of accelerators, proving that accelerators can be a launchpad.
However, the accelerator model has serious limitations and uneven outcomes. Even among the top “big three” accelerators (YC, Techstars, 500 Startups), only a small fraction of companies hit it big. Analysis of nearly 9,750 alumni from these programs shows only about 1.5% became unicorns and ~3.8% reached $100M+ valuations. In fact, the vast majority – nearly 69% – ended up as “walking dead” startups that stagnate without significant growth or exit. In other words, most accelerated startups still struggle or fail, just as non-accelerated ones do. This underscores that an accelerator is no magic bullet – it might modestly increase your odds, but it won’t overcome fundamental issues in a business model or product-market fit.
Moreover, many founders have found accelerators to be overly rigid or misaligned with their needs. By nature, accelerators impose a fixed curriculum and timeline on all teams in a cohort. This structure can become “an innovation zoo that wasted my time with incompetence and rigidity,” as one founder bluntly put it. Common complaints include junior staff or generic advice: “The curriculum is generic and doesn’t necessarily match your business needs. Who needs yet another workshop on the Business Model Canvas when you’re trying to close your 5th enterprise client?” In many programs, the mentor quality is hit-or-miss – some advisors are excellent, but others may give poor advice or simply use the platform to pitch their own consulting services. This reflects a key drawback: accelerators prioritize speed and standardization, which doesn’t suit every startup. A company that already has substantial traction or very specific market challenges might chafe at the “back to basics” elements of a typical program. As the founder of SEIKOURI has observed, trying to “squeeze [a] strategy into the accelerator’s tight framework” can be counterproductive if the framework isn’t tailored to your situation.
Finally, entrepreneurs should distinguish truly founder-friendly programs from predatory imitators. A bona fide accelerator (especially venture-style) usually invests in you or is free – they succeed only if you succeed. In contrast, many newer programs calling themselves accelerators are essentially consultancies that charge startups for coaching or investor introductions upfront. These can range from high-quality advisors to outright scams. As one discussion noted, “don’t be fooled by the ‘accelerator’ label” – always examine what a program actually provides and what it costs. If a program demands hefty fees or equity but offers little beyond what you could find in free online startup curricula, think twice. Legitimate accelerators rarely guarantee U.S. market success, and any that do should trigger skepticism.
In contrast to the cohort-based accelerator approach, some European startups choose a more bespoke, hands-on route to enter the U.S. market. Firms like SEIKOURI have built a business around this need, acting as “fractional” expansion teams for hire. In practice, this means taking on roles such as an interim U.S. country manager, business development lead, or talent recruiter on the startup’s behalf. This customized service model focuses on executing the nitty-gritty of market entry – establishing local partnerships, onboarding initial U.S. customers, hiring local employees, and adapting product positioning – all in a highly tailored way for the specific client. Essentially, it’s a consulting-plus-execution model: rather than guiding a dozen startups through generalized training, a hands-on expansion service dives deep into one startup’s strategy and actively helps implement it.
The advantage of this approach is its flexibility and focus. A dedicated expansion specialist can adjust the game plan on the fly, double down on what works for that particular product, and scrap what doesn’t – without being bound to a fixed 3-month curriculum or demo day schedule. For example, if a European B2B software company needs to refine its sales pitch for American corporate clients, a custom advisor can spend weeks directly reaching out to potential customers and refining messaging, whereas an accelerator might simply host a one-size-fits-all sales workshop. As Altios (a market entry consultancy) notes, the U.S. is not a monolithic market but “50 states, each with distinct rules, tax codes, and business cultures. This fragmentation creates a massive opportunity. It also creates massive risk.” Navigating such complexity often demands nuanced, situation-specific decisions – exactly the kind of work a bespoke service is suited for. A consultant or expansion manager can help a startup decide which state or city to launch in first, tailor the hiring strategy to local talent pools, and ensure compliance with regional regulations. These are areas where generic accelerator playbooks may fall short, since what works in one context (e.g., a fintech startup in New York) may require an overhaul in another (e.g., a manufacturing tech startup in Texas). Localizing business strategy is crucial for foreign companies, and experienced market-entry consultants emphasize cultural and operational adaptation to avoid costly missteps.
Another benefit of the hands-on model is that it directly adds execution bandwidth. Early-stage startups are often resource-constrained; founders wear multiple hats and may lack the time or expertise to cold-start a U.S. operation. A hired expansion lead can shoulder that burden immediately. This is markedly different from accelerators, which expect founders themselves to do the work (albeit with guidance). As one European founder cautioned about the U.S., “You also can’t succeed with a group of very smart Europe-based people alone… US buyers expect US-native leadership, sales, and marketing.” In other words, to win American customers’ trust, having people on the ground who understand the local market is often non-negotiable. A custom expansion service effectively provides that presence from day one – either by being physically present in the U.S. or by quickly assembling a local team for the startup. This can fast-track the credibility that might otherwise take a foreign founder months or years (and a transatlantic move) to build. While accelerators might help you plan a U.S. go-to-market, a service like SEIKOURI’s model will execute the go-to-market for you, then hand over a running operation. For many startups, that hands-on help during the critical market entry phase can mean the difference between floundering versus gaining a foothold. It’s a more expensive route (since it’s essentially consulting labor), but arguably a “pay-for-results” approach rather than an educational one.
Of course, customized services have limits too. Success still isn’t guaranteed – the startup’s product must resonate, and the consultant’s strategy must be sound. And not every startup can afford bespoke expansion support, just as not every startup can get into a top accelerator. But as a trend, we saw during the pandemic that flexible, remote-capable expansion strategies proved their worth. When travel bans hit, internationalization shifted from “we have to be there” to “we can sell there without actually being there.” In that period, firms that could adapt – offering remote business development, leveraging online channels, and generally being hands-on in a virtual sense – actually thrived, while more rigid traditional approaches stalled. SEIKOURI’s own growth during that time exemplifies how a tailored strategy (e.g,. helping clients sell into the U.S. via digital means, until they could physically expand) could outperform slower-moving competitors. The lesson is that being able to tailor and pivot your go-to-market approach quickly is invaluable, especially in unpredictable global conditions. A one-on-one expansion partner is naturally positioned to do that, whereas accelerators, bound by cohort schedules and standardized content, may struggle to give each startup custom attention in fast-changing circumstances.
Accelerator marketing often paints the U.S. as a promised land hungry for foreign startups – as if simply hailing from Germany or France makes your company desirable to American customers and investors. The reality is a bit more nuanced. On one hand, the United States actively courts foreign businesses in many sectors. The U.S. government’s SelectUSA program, for example, has facilitated over $200 billion in investment and hundreds of thousands of jobs from foreign companies establishing operations in the U.S. In 2025, the SelectUSA Investment Summit saw record attendance (5,500+ participants, a 40% jump), reflecting “unprecedented government commitment to foreign investment attraction.” Many U.S. states also compete to attract international startups and mid-sized firms by offering tax breaks, grants, and other incentives. Even in the venture capital arena, American investors are generally open to backing foreign-founded startups – especially if the founders relocate or the company incorporates in the U.S. The post-pandemic world has somewhat lowered barriers: virtual pitching and remote deal-making mean a promising startup can reach U.S. customers or secure funding without being immediately based in the U.S. In short, the door is open to European startups, and in fields such as AI, climate tech, and biotech, American companies and consumers seek innovative solutions from anywhere. In fact, despite some protectionist rhetoric, the current U.S. administration has implemented massive spending programs (e.g., in infrastructure, green tech, semiconductors) that need tech suppliers and partners – a savvy foreign startup can indeed ride that wave if positioned right.
However, it would be a mistake to assume Americans are waiting eagerly with a red carpet for every overseas startup. The U.S. market is intensely competitive and somewhat insular in consumer adoption. American customers have plenty of domestic options; they won’t switch to a foreign product unless it clearly outperforms or offers unique value. Culturally, U.S. business norms may require foreign founders to prove themselves more. Trust and credibility are crucial – as noted, being an ocean away can hurt your cause if you don’t establish a tangible U.S. presence or network. “In the US, being unknown can be worse than being wrong,” one UK entrepreneur observed, emphasizing that you can’t just dip a toe in and expect big results. Many European founders learn that success in the U.S. is a “bet-the-company” commitment, not a casual expansion. The uncomfortable truth is that the U.S. will likely force you to revalidate your product-market fit from scratch, adapt your pricing and messaging, and spend significantly on marketing or sales to gain visibility. Americans aren’t biased against foreign startups per se (Silicon Valley is full of immigrant founders), but they aren’t automatically impressed by them either. You still have to earn every customer and investor on merit.
The political and economic climate in the U.S. also adds a mixed backdrop for foreign entrants. Geopolitically, there’s a clear trend toward de-globalization and protectionism, even in historically open economies like the U.S. In strategic sectors such as defense tech, telecom, or semiconductors, U.S. policy now favors domestic or allied production – a foreign startup might face extra scrutiny or hurdles in these areas. High-level trade tensions (for example, with China) mean regulators are more cautious about foreign tech in critical infrastructure. Even beyond policy, the Buy American sentiment can influence public-sector procurement and consumer behavior to an extent. Meanwhile, on the economic front, rising interest rates and the 2022–2023 VC slowdown have made U.S. investors more selective with their capital. A few years ago, a nascent European startup might have easily raised a flashy U.S. venture round on promise alone; in today’s climate, investors often ask for traction and a convincing U.S. go-to-market plan. In fact, global startup ecosystem analysis in 2024 pointed out that local and regional strengths are gaining emphasis – founders can’t assume a frictionless leap to global markets.
All that said, the outlook isn’t grim – it’s realistic. The U.S. still offers unparalleled upside (a single continental market of 330 million people and the world’s deepest capital pools), but to capitalize on it, European startups should treat the opportunity with respect and due diligence rather than hubris. The accelerators that pitch an easy win gloss over the hard work required. No, Americans in general are not impatiently waiting for every German startup – but they are very willing to embrace a foreign startup that solves a real problem, speaks their language (literally and figuratively), and shows commitment to the market. The path to that point can be paved either via a good accelerator or via careful, customized expansion efforts – but in either case, realism and preparation are key.
Given how much effort European companies expend to enter the U.S., one might wonder whether the reverse is happening: do American startups join programs to expand into Europe? Overall, this appears to be rare. Our research found little evidence of U.S.-based accelerators specifically recruiting American startups for European market entry. The dynamics are quite different: the U.S. domestic market is huge and usually the first priority for American founders. Many will expand into Europe later in their growth cycle, typically by opening offices or acquiring local companies rather than participating in an EU-based accelerator. There are initiatives encouraging U.S. companies to establish a presence in Europe, but they’re typically driven by European institutions. For example, the EU’s European Innovation Council (EIC) Accelerator program – primarily aimed at European startups – is technically open to U.S. companies if they establish an EU presence, offering substantial grant funding and equity investment for those willing to set up in Europe. Similarly, national programs such as France’s “French Tech Ticket” and others have offered incentives to attract foreign (including U.S.) startups to incubate in their countries. But these are funding or soft-landing schemes rather than American accelerators exporting U.S. startups. They underline that Europe is interested in attracting U.S. businesses (for innovation and job creation), yet we did not find a thriving ecosystem of “U.S. accelerators” whose mission is to place American startups in Berlin or Paris.
The lack of reciprocal accelerators makes sense in context. Silicon Valley’s lore and resources have long drawn international startups to the U.S., whereas American startups often see global expansion as a later step once they dominate at home. Additionally, Europe’s market – while large in aggregate – is fragmented by country, language, and regulations. Expanding into Europe typically means tackling one country at a time (or a few, then scaling), a process that U.S. startups often handle by hiring regional managers or using channel partners, rather than enrolling in an accelerator program abroad. There are some U.S. advisory firms and government offices that help American SMEs enter European markets (for instance, the U.S. Commercial Service and various industry associations), but again, these are not accelerators in the classic sense. In short, the “European Accelerator for U.S. startups” is not a common model – the traffic is mostly one-way. This further highlights how special the U.S. market is viewed; it’s a must-have for global ambitions, whereas Europe, though lucrative, is often approached with a more incremental strategy by U.S. companies.
Looking ahead, what does all this mean for how a company like SEIKOURI should position its services, and for startups deciding between an accelerator or a customized expansion strategy? The post-pandemic trend suggests a hybrid mindset is taking hold. Startups have realized they can validate and even begin selling in a new market remotely (a “digital-first entry”) – for example, by running online marketing campaigns or conducting Zoom sales calls to test U.S. demand before investing in a physical presence. At the same time, the importance of local insight and commitment has been reasserted as travel normalized. The most successful expansion strategies seem to combine an initial low-cost market test with a follow-up full commitment once positive signals emerge.
Accelerators are also evolving to stay relevant in this new landscape. We see trends toward more specialized accelerators – programs focusing on a niche industry or a particular region – to provide deeper, tailored value rather than a generic crash course. There’s also growth in remote or hybrid accelerators, which allow startups to participate from anywhere, reflecting the distributed work norm. These changes are positive, but they also mean accelerators are no longer scarce – thousands exist worldwide, and founders are becoming more selective. In 2025, there were estimated to be over 8,000 accelerators globally, a significant increase from a decade earlier. With only ~3% of applicants admitted to top programs, many founders will either fall back on lower-tier (often paid) accelerators or seek alternatives. This opens an opportunity for consultative expansion services to position themselves as quality alternatives or complements to accelerators. For instance, SEIKOURI could position itself as “acceleration-as-a-service,” emphasizing its hands-on execution that accelerators typically lack. Instead of a startup spending 3 months in a cohort mainly learning and networking, they could spend 3 months with SEIKOURI actually landing clients and forging partnerships – coming out with tangible business deals, not just a demo day pitch.
The current climate in the U.S. – with its mix of high opportunity and high complexity – actually favors those who combine strategic insight with execution muscle. Startups are being advised that “the U.S. market rewards those who get it right the first time… mistakes are expensive”. This underscores the value of expert guidance (to avoid mistakes) and of someone rolling up their sleeves to get things done right on the startup’s behalf. It’s conceivable that in the future, we’ll see more hybrid models: perhaps accelerators offering “soft landing” services with consultants attached, or consulting firms partnering with accelerators to provide post-program execution support. From SEIKOURI’s perspective, staying flexible and outcome-driven will be key. If accelerators tout education and network, a hands-on firm should tout execution and results, backed by case studies of setting up X number of successful U.S. subsidiaries or closing $Y in deals for clients.
What works best today ultimately depends on the startup’s stage and needs. For a very early-stage European startup that needs funding and a broad introduction to startup best practices, a top accelerator (if they can get in) may still be hugely beneficial – it’s like joining a prestigious college. But for a post-product startup with a solid offering (and perhaps some funding already) that wants to efficiently “go global”, engaging a specialized expansion service or advisor might yield faster, more targeted progress than sitting in classrooms with other startups. In many cases, a combination is ideal: there are examples of European scale-ups that went through an accelerator (to get the initial U.S. network) and hired local experts to actually drive sales. Founders' key is to honestly assess their gaps. If you lack U.S. market knowledge and connections, a reputable accelerator or mentor network can fill those gaps. If you lack the bandwidth to execute an expansion, a hands-on partner can fill that gap. Neither route is inherently a scam or a silver bullet – each has success stories and failures. As one industry insider concluded, “Don’t drink the accelerator Kool-Aid, but don’t blindly hate either… there are bad actors… [and] not everyone needs an accelerator, but many founders would have done better had they joined one.” The same nuanced view applies to consulting services: the right help at the right time can be transformative, but the wrong help is a waste.
Looking ahead, tailored support appears to be gaining importance. Founders are increasingly aware that expanding to the U.S. is exceptionally challenging and not merely a checklist item. The current trend shows a strong uptick in mid-sized European firms establishing U.S. operations – a 23% increase from 2023 to 2024 – which indicates growing demand for guidance in this process. With governments on both sides encouraging international expansion (the U.S. wanting inbound investment, and Europe urging its startups to scale globally), startups will have many options for support. Those options range from public accelerator programs to private accelerators to consultants and advisors. The sweet spot for success likely lies in combining the best of both worlds: strategic know-how and personalized execution. For SEIKOURI, focusing on its proven strengths – being adaptable (remote or on-site as needed), providing hands-on partnership in building a U.S. business, and leveraging its transatlantic experience to steer clients clear of pitfalls – will align well with what the market is gravitating toward. In an era where international growth is both imperative and perilous, startups will gravitate to partners who offer trustworthy, no-nonsense help in “getting it right the first time.” And that is exactly where a seasoned, customized service can outperform a generic accelerator playbook by delivering a strategy tuned to today’s realities and a path forward.